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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to study the impact of the size and the quality
of social networks on the probability to ﬁnd a job. We ﬁrst develop a theoretical model in
which individuals are embedded within a network of social relationships. Workers can obtain
information about jobs via employed friends belonging to his/her social network. Workers
can be either uneducated or educated. We show that, conditional on being employed, the
probability to ﬁnd a job through social networks, relative to other search methods, increases
and is concave with the size of the network. The eﬀects are stronger for the uneducated.
There is however a critical size of the network above which this probability decreases. We also
show that the probability to ﬁnd a job through friends and relatives decreases with the local
unemployment rate. We test empirically these theoretical ﬁndings for Egypt using the 1998
Labor Market Survey. The empirical evidence supports the predictions of our theoretical
model.
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11 Introduction
It is commonly observed that job seekers use their friends and relatives to ﬁnd a job. The
empirical evidence suggests that about half of all jobs are ﬁlled through personal contacts.1
O n er e a s o np u tf o r w a r di st h a ti ti st h em o s te ﬃcient and the least costly job search method
(Holzer, 1988). Another explanation is that it allows ﬁrms, which are unable to identify the
characteristics of applicants because of adverse selection problem, to screen them.2 The focus
of this paper is diﬀerent. We analyze the acquisition and transmission of job information by
job seekers through their friends and relatives, and in particular the eﬀect of the size and
quality of social networks on the probability to ﬁnd a job.
Calvó-Armengol (2004) and Calvó-Armengol and Zenou (2003) were the ﬁrst to study the
eﬀect of the size of social network in a theoretical context. They use a job-matching model
in which workers ﬁnd jobs through social contacts. They show that more social contacts
increase the probability to ﬁnd a job, a standard result in the social network literature,
especially in sociology (see e.g. Wasserman and Faust, 1994). In this paper, however, we
only focus on the transmission of job information through social network rather than on the
matching process between ﬁrms and workers. Thus, we do not model the matching process,
but examine the transmission of job information by comparing the success of using “friends
and relatives” versus other search methods.
In particular, we focus on social networks of individuals that have only weak ties with
each other. We deﬁne a weak tie (as opposed to a strong tie in which the relationship is
repeated over time, for example members of the same family or very close friends) when
social interaction between two persons is transitory (like for example random encounters).
This is not the precise deﬁnition of weak ties ﬁrst used by Granovetter. In Granovetter’s
(1973), weak ties are expressed in terms of lack of overlap in personal networks between any
two agents; i.e. weak ties refer to a network of acquaintances who are less likely to be socially
involved with one another. Formally, two agents A and B have a weak tie if there is little or
no overlap between their respective personal networks. Vice versa, the tie is strong if most of
A ’ sc o n t a c t sa l s oa p p e a ri nB ’ sn e t w o r k . 3 However, the present paper is not concerned about
weak versus strong ties since we do not have this information in our data base. We focus
on social networks that are not strong (i.e. family and very close friends) because we are
interested in capturing random encounters and personal contacts that might arise in denser
areas. As Granovetter’s (1973) seminal work on the strength of the weak ties argues weak
ties are superior to strong ties for providing support in getting a job. So, it is more relevant
for us to focus on those types of social relationships. So, in the sequel, weak ties will refer
to random encounters and the social network considered is always composed of these types
1See, for example, Granovetter (1974), Holzer (1988), Corcoran et al. (1980) and Topa (2001).
2See for example Montgomery (1991) and Mortensen and Vishwanath (1994).
3We thank a referee for clarifying this point.
2of weak ties.
We develop a theoretical model in which individuals are embedded within a network of
social relationship. We distinguish between two types of workers: the low educated (illiterate
and less educated) and the high educated. We assume that the low educated workers only
search using their social networks while high educated workers use both formal and informal
(i.e. networks) methods. By assuming that density does not aﬀect the “job application or
at the gate” method (i.e. living in a denser area does not improve your chance to get a job
by this method, since even if on average you are more likely to pop in a ﬁrm with ads at
its gate, there are more workers that will do the same thing),4 we show that, conditional on
being employed, the probability to ﬁnd a job through friends and relatives increases and is
concave with the network size. We also show that for very dense networks, i.e. large number
of weak-tie friends, this probability can even decrease and that it always decreases with local
unemployment rate. The intuition runs as follows. Denser areas expose people to more
contacts (the size of the network of weak ties increases) so that each worker has more direct
friends and therefore has more job information through these friends. As a result, since
the probability to ﬁnd a job directly (i.e. “job application or at the gate” method) does
not increase with density, the probability to ﬁnd a job using friends and relatives increases.
The concavity stems from the fact that, if each worker has more friends, each of his/her
friends has also more friends to transmit information to, which creates congestion. For very
dense networks, this congestion can be so important that it outweighs the beneﬁts of large
networks so that the probability to ﬁnd a job decreases. Finally, the unemployment rate is
a measure of the quality of the network. If unemployment rate increases, workers are more
likely to have friends that are unemployed and so have less chance to get a job through their
friends and relatives.
To test this model we use population density as a proxy for the transmission of job in-
formation between weak ties belonging to the same network of relationships. Our conjecture
is that in denser areas, the network of social relationships is larger so that the size of the
network can reasonably be approximated by the population density of the area. This should
be particularly true for social networks consisting exclusively of weak ties s i n c ei ti sm o r e
likely to encounter more random acquaintance in denser areas (such as cities) than in less
dense areas (such as rural areas).5
Using the 1998 Egyptian Labor Market Survey, which is a nationally represented indi-
vidual level data covering more than 20,000 individuals, we ﬁnd that the probability to ﬁnd
a job through friends and relatives indeed increases and is concave with population density.
We also ﬁnd that the predicted probability to ﬁnd a job can even decrease when the area
becomes very dense,c o n ﬁrming one of the most surprising and controversial results of our
4We test the validiaty of this assumption in section 6.2.
5See section 3 for empirical evidence on this.
3theoretical model. This eﬀect is stronger for the illiterate and the less educated workers. We
then show that this probability is negatively aﬀected by the quality of the social network
measured by local unemployment rate.
Most of the empirical literature on social networks is largely conﬁned to U.S. and British
studies - except for Addison and Portugal (2002) who analyze job search methods and
outcomes in Portugal - and has mainly studied the relative eﬃciency of one search method
versus the others. For example, Holzer (1987, 1988) has shown that, in the U.S., for workers
aged 16 to 23 years, friends and relatives, and direct applications without referral are not
only the most frequently used search methods, but also the most productive in generating
oﬀers and acceptances. In a similar way, Blau and Robins (1990) in an analysis of Equal
Opportunity Pilot Project data for 1980 have shown that friends and relatives generate the
most oﬀers and acceptances per contact, while having the highest acceptance rate per oﬀer.
For the U.K., Gregg and Wadsworth (1996) ﬁnd similar results.
As stated above, our focus is diﬀe r e n ti nt h a tw es t u d yt h ei m p a c to fp o p u l a t i o nd e n s i t y
(as measured by the population per inhabited square Kilometer) on the probability to ﬁnd
a job using social networks in Egypt. This country is a particularly well adapted case study
since it has extremely large variations in terms of population densities. For example, Cairo
has around 27,000 inhabitants per square Kilometer whereas, for the least dense, Suez, it is
only 46.T h e r ea r ev e r yf e wc o u n t r i e st h a th a v es u c he x t r e m ed i ﬀerences. For instance, in
the United States, the highest dense MSAs are: Jersey City, New York and Chicago which
have respectively 4577, 2875 and 1243 inhabitants per square Kilometer.6 To the best of our
knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper that studies the relation between network size (as captured
by population density) and the probability to ﬁnd a job.
There is also an important empirical literature on social networks in less developed coun-
tries. However, the focus is essentially on migration and on how migrants obtain information
about jobs through friends and relatives (see for example Banerjee, 1981, 1983; Munshi, 2003;
Mazumdar, 1987). In fact, very few studies have analyzed the importance of social networks
in ﬁnding a job in less developed countries (without migration).7 A notable exception is
Assaad (1997) who found that, in Egypt, among construction workers, kinship ties and so-
cial networks matter less than their regional background in ﬁnding a job. In another paper,
Assaad (1993) found that, in the informal sector, employers prefer to hire craftsmen to whom
they have previous personal ties.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we develop the theoretical model.
In section 3, we provide some empirical evidence about the link between population density
and network size. Section 4 presents the data while the econometric model is presented in
6Source: U.S. Bureau of Census for the 1990 Census.
7A recent paper by Fafchamps and Lund (2003) ﬁnd strong evidence that social networks play a key role
in the provision of mutual insurance in Rural Philippines.
4section 5. In section 6, we discuss the econometric results and discuss alternative theories.
Finally, section 7 concludes.
2T h e t h e o r e t i c a l m o d e l
As stated above, our focus is on the impact of network size (weak ties) on the job acquisition
rate of workers. For that, we propose a model in which ﬁrms only advertise their jobs using
informal methods. For example, they can post help-wanted signs on their windows (or any
equivalent cheap methods) and hire the ﬁrst worker who is aware of this job.8 What is then
crucial for individuals is to obtain information about these jobs.
Because we model a developing country, we consider two types of workers: illiterate
and less educated, on the one hand, and educated, on the other. Indeed, in most LDCs, the
fraction of illiterate and less educated workers is quite high and their access to job information
is quite limited (for example they do not read newspaper ads). So for them it is obviously
more costly to use direct methods than friends and relative. For simplicity, we assume that
the unemployed low educated workers only use one method of search, namely friends and
relatives whereas the high educated can ﬁnd a job either directly (for example, a worker can
ﬁnd a job directly by passing by a ﬁrm, discovers the help-wanted-sign and applies at the
gate or ﬁlls in a form) or indirectly (through their friends and relatives). This means that
the unemployed low educated workers will devote all their time to search for a job through
friends and relative while the high educated will share their search time between the two
methods. We assume that each worker is endowed with one unit of time to search for a job
and we denote by 0 ≤ ae ≤ 1 t h et i m e( o re ﬀort) spent in searching for a job using friends
and relatives (where e = h,l stands for education, and h and l for respectively high and
low-educated workers). This implies that the low educated unemployed spend 1 unit of their
time on “friends and relatives” activities while the educated unemployed spend ah units of
their time on these activities and 1−ah on formal methods.9 This is a reasonable assumption
in the context of Egypt. In table 2, it is shown that illiterate and less-educated unemployed
use at least twice as much “friends and relatives” than any other search method in looking
for a job whereas for the educated it is equivalent or even less. Even more striking, table
1 shows that 39% of jobs found by low educated workers are through friends and relatives
while this number is 15% for the high educated workers.10
8In this paper, it is assumed that a contact leads automatically to a job.
9This paper does not deal with the optimal search methods used by ﬁr m s( f o rt h i si s s u e ,s e eP i s s a r i d e s ,
1979). We just assume diﬀerent search methods by ﬁrms and see how this aﬀects workers’ chance to ﬁnd
a job. Using the 1988 Holzer’s model, it would be easy to show that, as long as the cost of using formal
m e t h o d si ss u ﬃciently higher for the less- than the well-educated workers, we would obtain that al =1and
0 <a h < 1.
10Observe that in this paper we do not want to explain the relative eﬃciency of one search method relative
5Our aim is not to explain the existence and stability of networks11 but to take a network
as given and to investigate, for each case above, how the size and the quality of the network
aﬀects the probability to obtain a job.
Let us be more precise about the social network that is used by educated and non-
educated workers. Denote by ne the total population of workers of type e = h,l,w i t h
ne = Ue +Ee,w h e r eUe and Ee refer respectively to the unemployment and the employment
levels of workers with education e. We assume that networks are symmetric (or, in the
language of graph theory, regular). This means that each individual i =1 ,...,ne,w h oc a n
be either employed or unemployed, has exactly the same number of direct neighbors se <n e
and that if i is connected to j,t h e na l s oj is connected to i. For simplicity and without loss
of generality, we assume that sh = sl = s.12
We also assume that the quality of the network is the same within a group of workers
with education e = h,l (uniform mix), i.e. the number of employed and unemployed directly
connected to each worker is the same for all workers of type e and equal respectively to
(1 − ue)s and ues (where ue = Ue/ne i st h eu n e m p l o y m e n tr a t eo ft y p e - e workers). In
other words, there is a uniform mix within ag r o u pe but not between groups h and l.
This is consistent with the idea that agents usually sort, so workers whose type tends to
be correlated with a higher incidence of unemployment (say education) will be more likely
to connect with agents who are prone to higher expected unemployment. In particular,
if one views job ﬁnding and losing as a dynamic process, it usually leads to clustering in
outcomes so there will be pockets where agents mostly have unemployed workers in their
personal networks, and vice versa.13 In our framework, this means that the number of
employed and unemployed friends will be respectively higher and lower for the educated,
that is (1 − uh)s>(1 − ul)s and uhs<u ls. Indeed, even if they have the same number of
friends, the quality of their networks is diﬀerent since educated workers are more likely to
know friends that are employed while illiterate and less educated workers are more likely to
have friends that are unemployed.
Figures 1a and 1b illustrate two cases of symmetric networks. In ﬁgure 1a, there are
n =6workers and they are all connected to each other. Each worker has exactly 5 direct
neighbors and thus communicate with all the other workers. In ﬁgure 1b, the size of the
network is still n =6and the network is still symmetric, but incomplete.14 Some workers
have no relations with others since each individual only has now 3 direct neighbors. For
to the other by level of education. We want to see, for each education level, how network size (or density)
aﬀect the probability to ﬁnd a job.
11This is what Calvó-Armengol (2002) has done.
12Indeed, all our results remain unchanged when sh 6= sl.
13These are in fact exactly the results obtained by Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2004) who use a dynamic
model of social networks.
14To be complete, a symmetric network must be such that s = n − 1.
6example, worker 1 directly communicates with individuals 3, 4 and 5, but not with 2 and 6.
Observe that Figure 1a represents a complete and symmetric network which is not uniform
mixed unless all workers have the same employment status (they are either all employed or
all unemployed). Figures 2a, 2b and 2c give examples of incomplete symmetric networks
with uniform mix. Figure 2a describes an incomplete symmetric network with uniform mix
since each worker (employed or unemployed) has two direct neighbors, one being unemployed
and the other employed. Figures 2b and 2c display the same incomplete network (n =6 ,
s =3 ), but with diﬀerent uniform mixes. Indeed, the network in ﬁgure 2b is of better
quality than that of ﬁgure 2c since in the former each worker has three direct neighbors,
one being unemployed and the other two employed, whereas in the latter, only one of the
direct neighbors is employed while the other two are unemployed. In our framework, the
network in Figure 2b would correspond to that of high-educated workers where uh =0 .33
while the network in Figure 2c would describe the social structure of low-educated workers
with ul =0 .66.
[Insert Figures 1 and 2 here]
Let us now focus on the model. Firms are assumed not to advertise jobs through news-
papers (because it is assumed to be too costly), but rather using informal methods such as,
for example, help-wanted signs on their windows (this has obviously no costs). We would
like now to calculate the probability to ﬁnd a job through social networks, for both educated
and uneducated (i.e. the least- and less-educated) workers, given that the job information
is not equally available to everybody.
Assume that there are Ve vacancies and Ue unemployed workers (within a group e,a l lj o b s
and workers are assumed to be identical). This means that the labor markets of educated
and low educated workers are separate because they do not compete for the same job. This,
in particular, implies that social networks of the educated and the low educated do not
overlap.
For a low educated unemployed worker, the only way to hear from a job is through an
employed friend who belongs to his/her social network and who knows about a job and
transmits this information to him/her. An educated unemployed worker can learn from a
vacancy either exactly like the low educated or directly through a formal method.
Let us ﬁrst focus on the educated workers who use both formal and informal methods
to ﬁnd a job. Since there are nh workers in the economy, the probability that a worker h
(employed or unemployed) directly hears of a vacancy is equal to vh = Vh/nh < 1 (vh is thus
the vacancy rate).15 If this worker is unemployed, he/she takes it (this is the formal method).
If he/she is employed, he/she transmits this information to all his/her direct (unemployed)
neighbors. We assume that all unemployed neighbors are treated on equal footing, meaning
that the employed worker who has the job information does not favor any of his/her direct
15We assume that Vh <n h always holds.
7neighbors. As a result, the probability that an unemployed worker i is selected among the







This probability is quite easy to understand. Indeed, the probability that a given worker
j has k +1unemployed direct neighbors is equal to (1 − uh)
s−k−1 uk
h (i.e. this employed
worker has k unemployed direct neighbors plus worker i) and thus the probability that the
worker i is selected among all the k +1unemployed is 1
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h.N o w ,s i n c et h e
employed worker j has s direct neighbors (including worker i), the probability that j passes















1 − (1 − uh)s
su h
This implies that vh(1 − uh)ph(s) is the probability that a worker j is informed about a
job (probability vh), does not need it (probability (1 − uh)) and transmits this information
to worker i. Observe that formula (1) is quite general since it only assumes that the network
is symmetric (its size is given by s) and that it is uniform mixed (the quality of the social
network is the same for each worker). However, it assumes nothing on the quality of the
social network (i.e. how many unemployed and employed workers are directly connected
to each worker) so that k +1is unknown, nothing on nh, the number of educated workers
connected to each other (it can address small as well as big network), and nothing on how
workers are located in the network (this is why one must take into account the diﬀerent
combinations between s − 1 and k).
Consider ﬁgure 1b for example. We only know that s =3and nh =6and we have
no information on the quality of the social network and how workers are located in this
network. As a result, the probability that one of the direct friends of any unemployed worker
transmits a job information is ph(3) =
1−(1−uh)3
3uh . Indeed, take for example worker 2.W h a ti s
the probability that worker 3 (assuming that he/she is employed and has heard about a job
vacancy) will give him/her this job information? Since worker 3 has k +1neighbors (with
k =2 , and, apart of 1,t h et w od i r e c tn e i g h b o r sa r e5 and 6), three cases can arise. (i) Either
his/her two neighbors are employed (k =0 ), which occurs with probability (1 − uh)2,a n d
in this case, worker 1 automatically gets the job so that pk=0(3) = (1 − uh)2 ( i ti sj u s tt h e
probability that the two direct neighbors of 3 are employed and thus do not need the job).
(ii) Or only one of his/her neighbors is employed (k =1 ), which occurs with probability
(1 − uh)uh,a n dw o r k e r1 obtains the job with probability 1/2. However, since we do not
8know the employment status of each worker, there are two possible combinations: either 5 is
employed and 6 unemployed or the reverse. This implies that pk=1(3) = 2(1/2)(1−uh)uh =
(1−uh)uh. (iii) Or the two direct neighbors of 3 are unemployed (k =2 ), which occurs with
probability u2
h,a n dw o r k e r1 obtains the job with probability 1/3. Since there is only one
combination (5 and 6 are unemployed), pk=2(3) = (1/3)u2
h. Now, by summing these three
probabilities (pk=0(3) + pk=1(3) + pk=2(3)), we obtain our result.
If we now take ﬁgure 2b, then we have much more information since we know exactly the
employment status of each worker. In this case, what is the probability that 1 obtains job
information from his/her direct neighbor 5, who is employed (and is assumed to be informed
about a job)? If this is the case, then since worker 5 has also 3 neighbors, who are all
employed, the probability that 5 transmits information to 1 is obviously 1.
It should be clear from these simple examples that something is missing from formula
(1). Indeed, ph(s) gives the probability to ﬁnd a job through the social network using only
one neighbor. However, each worker has s direct links. As a result, in a symmetric network
of size s, the individual probability for an educated worker of hearing a job from personal
contacts through word-of-mouth communication, P(s,uh,v h),i sg i v e nb y :
P(s,uh,v h)=1− [1 − vh(1 − uh)ph(s)]
s (2)
Indeed, since vh(1−uh)ph(s) is the probability that one of the direct neighbors of a given
worker i transmits the job information, then [1 − vh(1 − uh)ph(s)]
s is the probability that
none of his/her s direct neighbors transmits this information to i and thus P(s,uh,v h) is
the complementary probability. Of course, (2) does not prevent the unemployed worker i to
receive more than one oﬀer (he/she can hear directly from a job and through one (or several)
friend(s)). In this case, this worker takes one job at random (since all jobs are assumed to
be identical) and the other oﬀer(s) is (are) lost.
Since the educated unemployed worker can also ﬁnd a job using the “job application or
at the gate” search method and since he/she spends ah units of his/her time on “ friends and
relatives” activities, the (general) individual hiring probability of an unemployed educated
worker is given by:
h(s,uh,v h)=( 1− ah)vh +( 1− vh)ahP(s,uh,v h) (3)
Let us now calculate this probability for the uneducated workers knowing that the un-
employed never hear directly of a job. It is only through their friends that are employed,
who hear from a job (for example on the workplace) and then transmit this information to
their unemployed friends. It is easy to see that this probability is
P(s,ul,v l)=1− [1 − vl(1 − ul)p(s)]
s (4)
9As stated above, the main diﬀerence between P(s,uh,v h) and P(s,ul,v l) is the quality
of the social network. For example, if one compares ﬁgures 2b (educated workers) and 2c
(uneducated workers), it is easy to see that any unemployed educated worker in the network
described in ﬁgure 2b has a higher probability to ﬁnd a job through friends and relatives than
an uneducated worker in the network of ﬁgure 2c. Indeed, take worker 1 (who is unemployed
in both ﬁgures) and let us calculate his/her probability to ﬁnd a job through his/her friends
and relatives. If 5 is assumed to be informed of a job, then the probability for 1 to obtain a
job through worker 5 is 1 in ﬁgure 2b and 1/2 in ﬁgure 2c. Furthermore, since in ﬁgure 2c,
worker 1 has only one worker who is employed (i.e. 5), then the probability to ﬁnd a job is
1
2vl(1 − ul)=0 .166vl.I nﬁgure 2b, since worker 1 h a st w ow o r k e r st h a ta r ee m p l o y e d ,t h e
probability to ﬁnd a job is 1.33vh.
To summarize,
Proposition 1 The probability to ﬁnd a job through friends and relatives is equal to ahP(s,uh,v h)
for the educated workers and to P(s,ul,v l) for the low educated workers, where 0 <a h < 1
and P(s,uh,v h) and P(s,ul,v l) are respectively given by (2) and (4).
We have now the following result:16
Proposition 2 Conditional on being employed, for reasonable sizes of networks (i.e. s<
s),17 the probability P(s,ue,v e) to have found a job through personal contacts, relative to
other search methods, increases and is strictly concave with the network size s. However,
when networks are very large (i.e. s>s), then this probability decreases. Furthermore, the
relative increase of this probability following an increase in s is higher for uneducated than
educated workers.
The following comments are in order. First, for both types of workers, in larger net-
works, the unemployed as well as the employed workers hear on average about more jobs
through their friends and relatives. Formally, this means that, for a ﬁxed size of popula-
tion ne, increasing the size of the network s rises P(s,ue,v e) the probability to ﬁnd a job
through friends and relatives. This result is quite intuitive since when the number of direct
connections increases, the source of information about jobs is larger and people ﬁnd it more
easy to obtain a job through their friends and relatives. This is the ﬁrst prediction of our
16The main intuitions of the proofs of Propositions 2 and 3 can be found in Calvó-Armengol and Zenou
(2003).




10model, which implies that, conditional on being employed, workers have a greater chance
to have found a job through their friends and relatives in bigger and more populated areas
(cities). Second, this relation between P(s,ue,v e) and s is concave, meaning that at the
margin the increase is less and less important. Indeed, when the network size increases, each
unemployed worker has more direct connections that can transmit job information, but each
of his/her direct neighbors has also more direct connections so that the information held
by every employed worker is now shared by a larger group of unemployed workers. Since
everybody has the same network quality (uniform mix), workers’ relative locations create a
negative network externality for their direct vicinity and thus congestion.T h e r e i s i n f a c t
more frictions and thus more coordination failures as the network expands since it is more
likely that multiple vacancies reach the same unemployed worker. This implies that, in very
dense and populated areas, the probability to ﬁnd a job is higher than that in less dense and
less populated areas, but the increase is not at the margin very large because of congestion
eﬀects. Third, when the size of the network is very large, then the congestion created by
workers’ negative network externalities is so large that it outweighs the beneﬁt of knowing
more people. As a result, when s is large enough, P(s,ue,v e) decreases. Finally, the main
diﬀerence between the educated and the low educated is that the impact of the size of
the network is smaller for the educated than the low educated. Indeed, because the latter
mainly use their network to ﬁnd a job (al =1 ), the impact of bigger networks on the prob-
ability to ﬁnd a job is higher for them than for the educated (0 <a h < 1)s i n c e ,f o rg i v e n
unemployment and vacancy rates, we have:
ah
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
∂P (s,.,.)
∂s
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ <
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
∂P (s,.,.)
∂s
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ (5)
Let us describe our second main result.
Proposition 3 Conditional on being employed, the probability of both the low educated and
educated workers to have found a job through personal contacts, relative to other search
methods, decreases with the unemployment rate.
This is also very intuitive. When the unemployment rate ue increases, it does not af-
fect ve = Ve/ne the probability to ﬁnd a job directly but it does inﬂuence the one using
friends and relatives. In fact, for both the educated and the uneducated, the number of
unemployed directly connected to every informed and employed worker rises. As a result,
when ue increases, there is a deterioration of the social network and thus ue and P(s,·,v e)
are negatively correlated.
Let us summarize our results.
(i) For both educated and low educated, conditional on being employed, the probability to
have found a job through social networks, relative to other search methods, increases
and is concave in denser networks;
11(ii) When networks are very dense, this probability decreases when the size of the network
increases.
(iii) The above two eﬀects are stronger for the low educated than for the highly educated
workers;
(iv) The probability to ﬁnd a job through friends and relatives decreases with the unem-
ployment rate.
We would now like to test these results. Our conjecture is that the same individual in
diﬀerent areas will not have the same number of friends s. More precisely, since our focus
is exclusively on social networks of weak ties, we conjecture that in more densely populated
areas (such as big cities), individuals are exposed to more random contacts and thus are
more likely to have more friends of these types (i.e. random encounters)18 to rely on to ﬁnd
aj o b .
3 Is population density a good proxy for network size?
In this section, we would like to motivate the link between the theoretical model and the
empirical analysis adopted. We are interested in how the size and the quality of social
networks aﬀect the probability of ﬁnding a job. We use population density as a proxy for
network size. So, it is important to discuss whether population density is a good proxy for
network size.19
We would like to give some sociological evidence of our conjecture that, as far as weak
ties are concerned, in denser and more populated areas (such as big cities), individuals are
exposed to more random contacts and thus are more likely to have bigger networks with
similar friends to him/her than in less dense areas.
The general consensus in sociology is that people in large cities, in comparison with
people in small towns or rural areas, experience general deﬁcits in the quality of interpersonal
relations (strong ties). This is the perspective of the so-called social disorganization theory
and the social capital literature (see e.g. Wirth, 1938, Coleman, 1988, and Putman, 1993,
2001).20 However, people in small towns or rural areas base their social networks on the
18Even though in rural environment, social networks of kinship ties, intimacy, and necessity prevail, in an
urban environment, friendship, superﬁcial contacts, instability, and voluntary action prevail and, as a result,
the number of potential “unstable” (or weak ties) friends is higher. See in particular our discussion in the
nest section.
19Our data set does not provide any information on the size of social nework (weak ties) for example
number of friends, neighbours, random encounters ..etc.
20This, in fact, goes back to Tonnies (1957, [1887]) and Simmel (1995 [1903]) with the idea of rural
gemeinschaft (or community) and urban gesellchaft (or association).
12limited number of people who live nearby whereas people in large cities have a great deal
of choice in constructing their social networks and can seek out others with similar values,
interests, and lifestyles (weak ties). This is the so-called subculture theory (see e.g. Fisher
1976, 1982). As a result, urbanites are less likely than rural dwellers to base their personal
networks on traditional sources (such as family) and are more likely to include voluntary
sources, such as friends, coworkers and club members. Thus, within these subcultures,
individuals are fully integrated.
Amato (1993) examines the diﬀerences between urban and rural dwellers, as well as
between large cities and smaller towns inhabitants, in the breadth of assistance received and
provided by friends and family. He ﬁnds that urbanites receive more help from friends than
do rural dwellers, give more help to friends, expect more help from friends, and expect less
help from relatives. In other words, he ﬁnds little support for the social disorganization
theory that argues that urban dwellers receive and provide less support from friends and
relatives compare to rural people.
In his classic paper Granovetter (1973) criticized the assumption that strong ties in dense
networks were strong in resource terms. Using the example of searching for a job, Granovetter
found that neighborhood based dense multiplex networks were limited in getting information
about possible jobs (see also Lin and Dumin 1986). In a dense multiplex networks everyone
knows each other, information is shared and so potential sources of information are quickly
shaken down, the networks quickly becomes redundant in terms of access to new information.
In contrast Granovetter stresses the strength of weak ties involving a secondary ring of
acquaintances who have contacts with networks outside ego’s network and therefore oﬀer
new sources of information on job opportunities. The network arrangements in play here
involve only partially overlapping networks composed mainly of single-stranded ties.
Fisher (1982) found that urban dwellers had more dispersed networks containing a higher
proportion of nonkin relations than did rural dwellers. This concurs with Wellman’s (1979)
research in a number of Toronto neighborhoods demonstrating that personal networks are
geographically dispersed with large variations in the number of contacts living in the neigh-
borhood. In a review of diﬀerent studies in the US, Korte (1980) concluded that urbanism
positively aﬀects only those relationships which are peripheral; central relationships includ-
ing ties between families and friends, remained unchanged. Palisi and Canning (1986) found
that urbanism was positively associated with the frequency of interaction among friends.
In a study of the relation of health to social networks and neighborhoods in several east
London neighborhoods, Cattell (2001) concluded that the most robust networks in terms of
health outcomes are those Solidarity Networks that combine positive aspects of dense and
loose networks. They consist of a wide range of membership groups, made up of similar and
dissimilar people involving strong local contacts of family and or local friends and neighbors
on the one hand, plus participation in formal and informal organizations on the other. As
13Cattell concludes “the more varied the network, the greater the range of resources accessible,
and the greater the potential beneﬁts to health.” (Cattell 2001: 1513).
The separation of networks of strong and weak ties is endorsed by the research of Henning
and Lieberg (1996). This study of selected neighborhoods in Linköping, Sweden, included
an investigation into both the structure of networks and the content of ties. Strong ties
were those of importance to the respondent and which were characterized by regular con-
tact. Weak ties consisted of nodding acquaintances, conversational contacts and contacts
that could be relied upon to be sources of practical help. Henning and Lieberg found that
neighborhood was relatively unimportant for both white collar and blue-collar residents -
three quarters of contacts were outside the local area. Strong-tie networks (averaging 12
persons) are made up primarily of kin (40 percent of relations). Neighbors only comprised
about 20 percent of the strong tie networks. When weak ties are considered there are three
times as many contacts in the neighborhood compared with strong ties. These contacts pro-
vided a feeling of home, security, practical and social support. Henning and Lieberg suggest
that weak ties are important for the things they deliver and for the fact that they provide
a type of relationship that can be most easily sustained in the neighborhood. Close ties are
often diﬃcult to sustain at close distance (over-familiarity can breed contempt) whereas the
more superﬁcial relations of weak ties need to be refreshed with regular contact. Strong and
weak ties are doing diﬀerent things and both are necessary for a healthy social network. This
research suggests that neighborhood is still a signiﬁcant site of social networks for weak ties.
To sum up, in more dense areas, individuals interact with more people and have more
random encounters than in sparsely populated areas. Although those relationships may not
be personal nor strong, yet those weak ties are the ones that are found in the sociology
literature to matter most for providing social support, in particular in ﬁnding jobs.
4 The data
This study uses individual level data from the Egypt Labor Market Survey (ELMS 98),
which is a nationally representative household survey carried out on a sample of almost 5000
households, sampling over 20,000 individuals, in late 1998.21 The data set is comprised of
three questionnaires: 1) the household questionnaire; 2) the individual questionnaire; 3) the
21The data set was collected by the Economic Research Forum (ERF) in close collaboration with the
Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS) in Cairo. The 1988 LFSS was the ﬁrst
survey in Egypt to collect detailed data on employment characteristics, labour mobility, earnings and other
labour market variables. Taking the 1988 LFSS as a baseline, the 1998 ELMS has replicated the design and
methodology used in the 1988 LFSS to ensure comparability of the two data sets. Both surveys are based
on a multi-stage stratiﬁed random sampling. Weighting schemes were designed to correct for bias in the
selection process and expansion weights were based on the population estimates- see Assaad and Barsoum
(1999) for a description of the sampling and questionnaire design of the ELMS 1998.
14family enterprise questionnaire. Each household has at least one household questionnaire and
one individual questionnaire. Data for the household questionnaire was collected from the
head of the household and included the roster of members of the household, each individual’s
relationship to the head of the household and demographic characteristics of the household.
The individual questionnaire were administered to individuals six years old and above. A
battery of individual modules was designed to collect data on individual characteristics,
employment characteristics, unemployment, mobility and career history, and earnings. In
addition, the ELMS 98 collected information on job search methods used by unemployed
workers, as well as job ﬁnding methods used by employed waged workers.
Employed individuals22 working for wages were asked about the main job search method
used in ﬁnding their current jobs. The survey provided quite an extensive list of job search
methods used as follows:23 1) asked friends and relatives, 2) registered in Government em-
ployment oﬃce, 3) entered government job competition,24 4) inquired at work place, 5)
job application, 6) placed an advertisement in newspapers, 7) answered an newspapers ad-
vertisement, 8) registered in private employment oﬃce, 9) contacted or were contacted by
employer, 10) through labor recruiter (workers getting jobs through a contractor for example,
construction workers), 11) street labor market (waited at gathering location for workers to
be contacted directly by employers mainly for construction work), 12) other methods used.
In addition, those currently unemployed were asked about the job search method they were
using to ﬁnd a job, but they were allowed to list more than one job search method, i.e.
respondent reports yes or no to a list of job search methods.25
Our analysis is based on 4522 employed workers and 976 unemployed workers, aged 15-64
years old. Table 1 shows that almost one third (32.5%) of all employed workers obtained
their current jobs through friends and relatives. This proportion is much higher for illiterates
and less educated workers - 39%. However, among the educated only 15% found their jobs
through social network. Thus, as suggested by the theoretical model, the least educated tend
to ﬁnd jobs through informal methods more than educated workers do. Table 2 also shows
that the main search methods used by the unemployed are “friends and relatives” (52.1%).
Again, the least educated use more their social network to search for a job compared to the
educated unemployed. It is also important to note that the educated workers tend to use
22Methods used in getting current main jobs were collected for waged workers only and not for self-
employed, employers and unpaid workers
23Observe that the theoretical model has shown that, as long as ﬁrms use informal methods to recruit
their workers, then whatever these methods are, all our theoretical results hold. This implies that, in the
empirical analysis, we do not need to have information on the search methods used by ﬁrms, but only on
the ones used by workers.
24Egypt has a large public sector where around 35% of non-agricultural jobs belong (McCormick and
Wahba, 2002).
25The deﬁnition of “unemployment ” used here is the ILO conventional one and refers to a worker who
has no work, currently available for work and searching for work. The reference period is 3 months.
15and get more jobs through formal methods in particular through Government employment
oﬃces- an issue we will come back to later.
[Insert Tables 1 and 2]
Table 3 examines the characteristics of both employed and unemployed individuals who use
friends and relatives. More precisely, 55% of young unemployed workers (15-19 year old)
are searching for a job using friends and relatives. Compared to the U.S., Holzer (1987,
1988) found that, among the young unemployed, 80% are using “friends and relatives”.
Among employed men, 35% obtained their jobs through friends and relatives compared to
21% for women, and 57% of young employed workers (15-19 year old) have obtained their
current jobs through social networks. Compared to the U.S., approximately 50% of all
workers currently employed found their jobs through friends and relatives (Montgomerry,
1991). So, the evidence so far indicates that the less educated workers use the most “friends
and relatives” as their main method of search. This is true both for the unemployed and
the employed. Similar results are found by Holzer (1987, 1988). As a result, even though
the ﬁgures are a little below the ones obtained for the U.S., it should be clear that social
networks are an important aspect of the Egyptian labor market, in particular for the least
educated.
[Insert Table 3 here]
5 The econometric model
We model the determinants of employed workers having found a job through friends and
relatives. We assume that the probability of success is a logistic function where: z =1
if an employed worker successfully managed to ﬁnd a job through friends and relatives,
and z =0if an employed worker successfully managed to ﬁnd a job otherwise (through
other methods). We examine, conditional on being employed, the probability of having used
friends and relatives as the main job search method versus not (having used other job search
methods).
P(zi =1 |Ei =1 )=
eβ0x
1+eβ0x
P(zi =0 |Ei =1 )=
1
1+eβ0x
A set of explanatory variables explaining the probability of using friends and relatives
are included, namely network characteristics, individual characteristics and regional charac-
teristics.
16Our theoretical model predicts that the transmission of information is better in larger
social networks, i.e., conditional on being employed, the probability to ﬁnd a job through
networks increases with the size of the network. It also predicts that there are decreasing
returns to scale if the network is too large and that the quality of the network does matter
for ﬁnding a job. As stated above, in our empirical analysis, we capture the size of the
network of weak ties and the transmission of information by the population density of the
area (population measured in thousands per inhabited square Kilometer) in the governorate
(county).26 O u rc o n j e c t u r ei st h a ti nd e n s e ra r e a st h es a m ei n d i v i d u a li sm o r el i k e l yt oh a v e
more random encounter friends to rely on than in less dense areas. Thus, we expect that
in dense areas, the transmission of information through networks is better than in sparse
areas. However, as the theoretical model predicts, if the area is too dense, then there is
congestion and, at the margin, the probability to ﬁnd a job through network is concave and
can eventually decrease. To allow for this non-linear relationship, density squared is also
included.
In addition, we capture the quality of the network by including unemployment rates in
the governorate for three diﬀerent educational levels. We assume that an individual’s friends
tend to be of similar educational background and use the unemployment rate of the relevant
educational group. We also control for the quality of the personal network by including the
number of individuals in the household who are in the Labor Force. The idea is that the
more family members who are in the labor force, the better knowledge and information on
jobs they will have and transmit. In addition, we use three other variables related to the
father’s background and employment. Thus, we include a dummy if the father is illiterate,
a dummy if the father has a public sector job, and therefore would have access to inﬂuential
acquaintances, and a dummy if the father is out of the labor force.
We also control for job characteristics of employed workers. First, we distinguish between
5 sectors of employment. (i) public sector (government and public enterprises), (ii) private
non-agricultural formal sector, (iii) private non-agricultural semi-formal sector, (iv) private
non-agricultural informal sector, and (v) agricultural sector. Informal employment refers
to activities that are unregulated by the formal institutions and regulations of society such
as labor laws, registration and taxation. We use three diﬀerent indicators to explore the
various dimensions of informality: (i) no job contract, (ii) no social security coverage, (iii)
neither contract nor social security. So, a private formal worker is a worker who has a
job contract and social security. A private semi-formal worker has either a job contract or
social security contribution. A private informal worker has neither a job contract nor social
security. In addition, we distinguish between blue and white collar workers. The reference
is blue collar worker and we use three dummies to capture the diﬀerences in white-collar
26We use the Egypt Human Development Report (1998/9) to calculate the population density for each
governorate. There are 26 governorates (administrative units) and 6 regions in Egypt.
17occupation: 1) technical and scientiﬁc, 2) management, and 3) clerical. Finally, we capture
the industry/economic activity to which the current job belongs to using: manufacturing,
trade, agriculture and others.
We ﬁnally control for individual characteristics: gender, age, education and martial sta-
tus. We ﬁrst use three educational dummies: illiterate, less educated (primary and less than
secondary education) and educated (secondary and university graduates). Although we then
estimate diﬀerent regressions for the two types of workers: the least educated (illiterate and
less educated) and the educated given that our theoretical model predicts stronger eﬀects for
the least educated ones. We use a dummy for male. Six age dummies are included: 15-19,
20-29, 30-39,40-49, 50-59, and 60-64, where the reference age group is 20-29. We also use
a dummy for married individuals and for heads of households. Finally, we capture regional
characteristics by including 6 regional dummies: Greater Cairo, Alexandria and Canal Cities,
Urban Lower, Urban Upper, Rural Lower and Rural Upper.27
[Insert Table 4 here]
6 The empirical results
6.1 The Impact of Social Networks
Table 5 conﬁrms the predictions of our theoretical model. Indeed, conditional on being
employed, the probability to have found a job using friends and relatives, compared to other
search methods, is higher in denser areas than in less dense areas. This means that, in
denser areas, the transmission of job information between weak ties through social networks
is better: people are more likely to have more random encounters, either directly or indirectly
(friends of friends) in denser areas. More precisely, increasing the average population density
by 10 percent, increases the mean probability to ﬁnd a job using friends and relatives by 2.2
percent. Moreover, Table 5 also indicates that congestion eﬀects do exist. When the area
becomes too dense, then the probability to ﬁnd a job through friends and relatives increases
at a decreasing rate. Our theoretical conjecture is that in too dense areas, the friends of my
friends are in competition with me and create negative externalities to each other. However,
this eﬀect of social network is stronger for the low educated relative to those well educated
workers as shown in Table 5. Those with no education or little education seem to rely more
on their social random encounters for obtaining jobs. In addition, the quality of the network
has the predicted sign. When the average local unemployment rate increases by one percent,
the mean probability to ﬁnd a job through networks falls by 0.04 percentage points. This
is because, in addition to the size, what really matters is the quality of the network: it is
27The deﬁnition of all the explanatory variables are given in Table 4.
18who you know! (Mortensen and Vishwanath, 1994). In other words, the transmission of job
information is aﬀected by the quality of those people an individual encounter in one’s daily
life.
One variable aiming at controlling for the quality of the network is whether the father of
the job holder works in the public sector or not. Indeed, public sector jobs in Egypt imply
tenure jobs (civil servants) and prestige, which may lead to high quality social contacts.
We ﬁnd that the mean probability to ﬁnd a job through networks increases by 6 percentage
points if the father has a public job. We also ﬁnd that this eﬀect of density on the probability
to ﬁnd a job through friends and relatives is robust to employment duration.28
[Insert Table 5 here]
Figure 3a conﬁrm our seemingly surprising theoretical predication that the probability
to ﬁnd a job through social networks can even decrease for very large networks.29 Indeed, in
Egypt, when population density is above 4,000 inhabitants per square kilometer, then the
predicted probability to ﬁnd a job through friends and relatives starts to decline. Interest-
ingly, in Greater Cairo, which is the most dense area (around 27,000 inhabitants per square
kilometer), a worker with similar characteristics has a lower probability to ﬁnd a job through
friends and relatives (34 percentage points) than for example in Port Said (around 4,000 in-
habitants per square kilometer) in which this probability amounts to 43 percentage points.
It is indeed more likely that, in Greater Cairo, social networks of weak ties are very dense
and lead to negative externalities and congestion for job seekers because the job information
sharing is much more higher than in less dense areas. Figures 3b and 3c also support our
prediction that the eﬀect is stronger for the least educated workers.
[Insert Figures 3a,3b,3ch e r e ]
In order to test the robustness of our results, we study the impact of population density on
the probability of the unemployed workers to use friends and relatives as their main search
method.30 Table 6 displays these results. We indeed ﬁnd that population density does
positively aﬀect social network since denser areas imply that the unemployed use more their
social networks. This strengthens our previous results since it shows that the unemployed
28We have tried several employment duration: 3 years, 5 years, 8 years and more than 8 years of em-
ployemnt. The results, which are not reported but are available upon request, were robust throughout.
29For sake of clarity, in Figures 3 and 4, Greater Cairo is excluded because it is out of scale. In Figure
3, the predicted probability of obtaining a job is continuously decreasing after 7,000 inhabitants per square
Kilometer while in Figure 4, the probability of unemployed using friends and relative is increasing after 7,000.
Figure 3 is based on Col 1, Table 5 and refers to a representative individual: a male, blue-collar worker, aged
20-29 years old, who has no education, and lives in Greater Cairo.
30For the econometric model, as in the previous case, we assume that the probability is a logistic function,
where y =1if the unemployed uses friends and relatives as a job search method and 0 otherwise.
19use more their social networks to get jobs in denser areas. This result is similar to the
ﬁndings of Holzer (1987, 1988) and Blau and Robins (1990) since it shows that friends and
r e l a t i v e si sap o p u l a ra n de ﬃcient search method. However, the most relevant result for
us is displayed in Figures 4a-4c.31 Contrary to Figure 3a, one observes that there is not a
monotonic relationship between the predicted probability of using friends and relatives as
the main search method for the unemployed and the population density. In particular, we do
not have here the interesting, but surprising result of Figure 3a that this probability could
sharply decrease when areas are very dense (it does decrease but just slightly). This could
conﬁrm our theoretical intuition in which congestion eﬀects are so important in very dense
areas that they reduce the probability to ﬁnd a job through friends or relatives.
[Insert Table 6 and Figures 4a,4b,4ch e r e ]
Table 7, which uses predicted probabilities, conﬁr m st h a tt h ee ﬀects are much stronger for
less educated workers than educated ones. Indeed, when a worker is less educated, he/she
relies more on friends and relatives because low-skill jobs are less likely to be advertised
and are more likely to belong to the informal sector, especially in Egypt. The predicted
probability of getting a job through friends and relatives for the reference worker (i.e. a
blue-collar worker aged 20-29 years old who lives in Greater Cairo) is the highest for illiterate
individuals: Nearly ﬁfty percent of them ﬁnd a job using their networks whereas it is only
ﬁfteen percent among the educated workers. Even though the numbers are diﬀerent, this
result is also consistent with the US since Holzer (1988) ﬁnds that less educated are also
more likely to use friends and relatives than educated workers.
[Insert Tables 7 here]
6.2 Alternative theories
So far we have examined the empirical evidence which tends to support our theoretical
prediction. However, there may be other possible factors that may explain why network
size positively aﬀects the probability to ﬁnd a job using social networks other than our
explanation regarding the role of social network in job information transmission.
First, an alternative explanation could be that in more dense areas there are relatively
more jobs than in less populated areas so that the chance to ﬁnd a job also increases.
T h e r ei si nf a c tar e l a t e dl i t e r a t u r eo nt h i si s s u ei nl a b o re c o n o m i c s( s e ei np a r t i c u l a rt h e
survey by Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001). The starting point of this literature is the
matching function that gives the number of matches per period as a positive function of the
31Figure 4 is based on Col 1, Table 6 and refers to a representative unemployed individual: a male who is
aged 20-29 years old, has no education, and lives in Greater Cairo.
20unemployment level and the total number of vacancies in the economy. The empirical test
is to see whether or not the matching function (which can be measured at diﬀerent spatial
levels) has constant returns to scale (or equivalently homogeneous of degree one). Most of
the empirical studies that have been undertaken for diﬀerent countries (more than twenty
countries from the US, Europe, Japan, ...) tend to support the constant returns to scale
hypothesis, meaning that more populated areas that have both more unemployed and more
jobs do not lead to a higher probability to ﬁnd a job. We examine this potential alternative
explanation of whether more dense areas have more jobs and therefore one would observe
higher probability of ﬁnding jobs through social network as follows. We use the relative
number of jobs to the labor force (by governorate). First, we check the correlation between
t h er e l a t i v en u m b e ro fj o b st ot h el a b o rf o r c ea n dd e n s i t y ,b u tﬁnd no correlation (0.23).
T h e nw ee x p l o r et h er e l a t i o n s h i pb e t w e e nt h er e l a t i v en u m b e ro fj o b sa n dt h ep r o b a b i l i t yo f
ﬁnding a job through friends and relatives. Table 8 shows that the more jobs relative to the
labor force, the more likely workers get jobs through friends and relatives, in particular for the
least educated. However, what is important to notice here is that even when we control for
that eﬀect, our previous empirical evidence on the impact of density is still robust. In other
words, in more dense areas, and controlling for the relative number of jobs, the probability
of workers getting jobs through friends and relatives is still positive and concave.
Secondly, the public sector plays a very pivotal role in the Egyptian labor market. A
public employment drive was undertaken after the extensive nationalization in the early
1960s. As a result, the public sector share in total employment rose from 10% in 1960 to
around 35% by the end of the 1990s. The growth of public jobs has been underpinned by
an ’employment guarantee’ which entitled university and secondary school graduates to a
public appointment. Once a year the Ministry of Manpower invites applications specifying
preference from eligible graduates and at the same time solicits requests from government
agencies and enterprises for graduate employees. Apart from certain speciﬁed categories
(medical doctors and teachers), public agencies have only been allowed to hire graduates
through this system, although public enterprises are allowed to select their own hiring levels
and employees, but public enterprises represent only a quarter of public sector employment.
However, one of the important features of public jobs allocation in Egypt has been its lack of
favoring local residents. In other words, there is no search advantage to locating near public
jobs-see McCormick and Wahba (2003).
Given the role of the public sector in Egypt, one alternative explanation to our empir-
ical results could be that denser areas have more governmental institutions and therefore
more public sector jobs. Thus, there would be a link between population density and the
probability of ﬁnding job through friends and relatives that would represent an alternative
explanation for our previous empirical ﬁndings. Let us now show that this alternative theory
can be ruled out. We ﬁrst examine the correlation between population density and the share
21of public jobs in total employment, but ﬁnd no correlation (0.28).32 In other words, more
populated areas or bigger cities do not have more public jobs, relative to private jobs, than
less dense areas. This is consistent with McCormick and Wahba (2003) who point out public
jobs are unevenly allocated among regions and among urban areas as well.
We also capture the role of the public sector by using the share of public sector jobs
in total employment as shown in Table 8. The empirical evidence suggests that there is a
negative relationship between the probability of using friends and relatives and the share of
public sector in total employment. Indeed this is not surprising given that the main method
for obtaining a government job is through formal methods such as applying to government
employment oﬃces or though government competition. In addition, and more important is
that controlling for the share of public jobs, does not alter the eﬀect of population density on
the probability to ﬁnd a job through friends and relative: the probability of workers getting
jobs through friends and relatives is still positive and concave.
[Insert Table 8 here]
Finally, we conduct one ﬁnal test to check for the robustness of our empirical results. We
test whether network size positively aﬀects the probability to ﬁn daj o bu s i n gg o v e r n m e n t
employment oﬃces or government competition. Table 9 shows that there is a negative
relationship between density and the probability of directly ﬁnding a job through government
employment oﬃce or competition, i.e. denser areas reduce the probability to ﬁnd a job
through government means. In other words, denser areas increase the probability to ﬁnd a
job only through friends and relatives and not through government employment oﬃce. Thus,
our empirical evidence has been robust to both alternative explanations and supports the
predications of our theory.
[Insert Table 9 here]
7C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we study the impact of population density (as measured by the population
per inhabited square Kilometer) on the probability to ﬁn daj o bu s i n gs o c i a ln e t w o r k s .F o r
that, we develop a theoretical model in which individuals (educated and uneducated) are
embedded within a network of social relationships and ﬁrms only advertise their jobs using
informal methods (e.g. help-wanted signs on their windows). What is crucial here is to
obtain information about jobs. This can be done indirectly via an employed friend who
does not need the job and transmits this information to his/her direct neighbors. We show
32We use the Egypt Human Development Report (1998/9) for the share of public sector jobs in total
emmployment by governorate.
22that the probability to ﬁnd a job through friends and relatives increases and is concave with
population density. This eﬀect is stronger for the uneducated than the educated. We also
show that, beyond a certain size of the network, this probability decreases. Finally, the
probability to ﬁnd a job through friends and relatives decreases with local unemployment
rate.
We then test empirically these theoretical ﬁndings using Egyptian data. The empirical
evidence supports the predictions of our theoretical model. The empirical ﬁndings indicate
that conditional on being employed, the probability to have found a job through friends and
relatives increases and is concave with population density. In addition, the evidence supports
the seemingly surprising theoretical prediction that, above a certain size of the population
density, that predicted probability is reduced. This eﬀect is stronger for the least educated
workers. We also ﬁnd that this probability is negatively aﬀected by the local unemployment
rate.
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Table 1: Percentage of Jobs Found by Employed Workers Using Each Method  











Government employment office  27.5  17.9  53.3 
Government job competition  13.9  12.1  18.8 
Contacted or were contacted by employer  9.5  12.4  1.9 
Job application  5.5  5.6  5.0 
Labor recruiter  4.2  5.7  0.2 
Newspaper Ads  2.6  2.0  3.3 
Inquired at work place  2.5  3.3  0.6 
Private employment office  0.2  0.1  0.3 
Others 1.5  1.9  0.7 
 
 
Table 2: Search Methods Used by Unemployed (%)* 











Government employment office  32.3  25.3  46.0 
Government job competition  29.6  27.8  48.7 
Job application  24.3  21.3  35.4 
Newspaper Ads  24.8  20.4  39.4 
Inquired at work place  21.5  23.4  14.7 
Contacted or were contacted by employer  11.8  12.5  9.4 
Private employment office  7.6  5.7  14.3 
Labor recruiter  5.3  6.8  0 
Others 2.9  3.7  0 








Gender: Male  35.29  55.12 
              Female  20.71  49.13 
 





                     20-29  44.67  52.04 
                     30-39  28.62  51.42 
                     40-49  20.50  53.71 
                     50-59    19.24  37.22 







                  Less than Secondary   36.17  55.31 
                  Secondary & University  15.00  45.30 
 





Head of Household  27.91  51.52 
 





Public Sector  30.75  39.09 
Out of the Labor Force  6.08  5.16 
 





                     Management  11.95  -- 
                     Clerical   14.84  -- 
                     Sales  60.51  -- 
                     Services  34.76  -- 
                     Agriculture  50.29  -- 






            Private Formal  49.45  -- 
            Private Semi-formal  69.31  -- 
            Private Informal  57.28  -- 







               Manufacturing  51.70  -- 
               Utilities  17.11  -- 
               Construction  27.87  -- 
               Trade  61.55  -- 
               Transport  47.71  -- 
               Finance  37.33  -- 
               Services  12.22  -- 
 





              Alexandria & Canal Cities  30.00  64.47 
              Lower Urban  23.47  51.55 
              Upper Urban  23.30  39.38 
              Lower Rural  31.86  54.01 
              Upper Rural  30.76  39.97 
Sample Size  4522  976 
Note:   1. Employed workers who got their job through using friends and relatives. 
  2. Unemployed using friends and relatives as one job search method.   





Density Population  (in  thousands)  per  inhabited square Kilometer, by 
governorate 
Density Squared  Density squared 
Unemployment rate  Unemployment rate in governorate by educational group 





Father: illiterate  Dummy=1 if father is illiterate 
Father: Public  Dummy=1 if father is employed in the Public Sector 




Male Dummy=1  if  male 
 
Age Group: (ref. 20-29) 
                     15- 19   Dummy=1 if 15-19 year old 
                     30-39  Dummy=1 if 30-39 year old 
                     40-49  Dummy=1 if 40-49 year old 
                     50-59    Dummy=1 if 50-59 year old 
                     60-64  Dummy=1 if 60-64 year old 
 
Education: (ref.: illiterate)  
                  Less than Secondary   Dummy=1 if educational level is less than secondary 




Dummy=1 if married 
Head of Household  Dummy=1 if head of household 
 
Region of Residence: (ref. Greater Cairo)  
              Alexandria & Canal Cities  Dummy=1 if individual lives in Alexandria or Canal Cities 
              Lower Urban  Dummy=1 if individual lives in Lower Urban Egypt 
              Upper Urban  Dummy=1 if individual lives in Upper Urban Egypt 
              Lower Rural  Dummy=1 if individual lives in Lower Rural Egypt 
              Upper Rural  Dummy=1 if individual lives in Upper Rural Egypt 
 
Occupation: (ref. blue collar ) 
           Technical & scientific   Dummy=1 if technical & scientific 
           Management  Dummy=1 if management 
           Clerical  Dummy=1 if clerical 
 
Sector: (ref. public) 
            Private Formal  Dummy=1 if non-agriculture private formal  
            Private Semi-formal  Dummy=1 if non-agriculture private semi-formal 
            Private Informal  Dummy=1 if non-agriculture private informal 
            Other   Dummy=1 if agriculture 
 
Industry: (ref. other industries) 
 
            Manufacturing  Dummy=1 if industry is manufacturing 




Relative number of Jobs to LF  Relative number of jobs to labor force in governorate 
Share of PS in total jobs  Share of public sector jobs in total employment by governorate  
Table 5: Probability of Getting a Job Using Friends & Relatives: Marginal Effects 




Social Network: Size 














Social Network: Quality 
    








    



































Age Group:  
    

































    
                  Less than Secondary   -0.018 
(0.57) 
---- ---- 
                  Secondary & University  -0.081** 
(1.80) 
---- ---- 














     
































    




















    

























    












Log-Likelihood -1958.51  -1567.04  -356.13 
Pseudo R-squared  0.287  0.228  0.395 
Sample size   4522  3085  1437 
Notes: Absolute values of robust t-statistics are in parentheses Robust (Huber/White/sandwich) estimator of the 
variance was used in place of the conventional Maximum Likelihood Estimation variance estimator and observations were 
allowed to be not independent within cluster.* significant at 10% level. ** significant at  5% level. ***significant at 
1% level. Marginal effects show the increment in the probability relative to the sample mean, corresponding to 
the particular characteristic, relative to the reference group. The reference group: a blue-collar worker, aged 20-
29 years old, who has no education, and lives in Greater Cairo.  
Table 6: Probability of Unemployed Using Friends & Relatives: Marginal Effects 




Social Network: Size 














Social Network: Quality 
   








   


































Age Group:      


























Education:       
                  Less than Secondary   0.045 
(0.85) 
---- ---- 
                  Secondary & University  -0.047 
(0.70) 
---- ---- 












Region:       






























Log-Likelihood  -642.61 -498.21 -133.37 
DF  19 19 15 
Sample  size    976 759 217 
Notes Absolute values of robust t-statistics are in parentheses Robust (Huber/White/sandwich) estimator of the 
variance was used in place of the conventional Maximum Likelihood Estimation variance estimator and observations were 
allowed to be not independent within cluster.* significant at 10% level. ** significant at 5% level. ***significant at 
1% level. Marginal effects show the increment in the probability relative to the sample mean, corresponding to 
the particular characteristic, relative to the reference group. The reference group: unemployed individuals, aged 
20-29 years old, and live in Greater Cairo. The reference group is also illiterate - Col 1.  
Table 7: Predicted Probabilities of Using Friends & Relatives 
 Probability 
  
Predicted Probability of Getting Job through 
Friends & Relatives 
Employed Worker:   
Illiterate 0.469 
Less educated 0.341 
Educated 0.143 
   
Predicted Probability of Searching  for Job 
through Friends & Relatives 
Unemployed Worker:  
Illiterate 0.456 
Less educated 0.540 
Educated 0.465  
Table 8: Probability of Getting a Job Using Friends & Relatives: Alternative theories: 
Marginal Effects 




Social Network: Size 



















     













Social Network: Quality 
     










     













































Age Group:  
     



























































      










































     


























     































     
















Log-Likelihood -1565.57  -1562.69  -356.06  -355.95 
Pseudo R squared  0.228  0.230  0.395  0.396 
Sample size   3085  1437 
Notes: Absolute values of robust t-statistics are in parentheses Robust (Huber/White/sandwich) estimator of the 
variance was used in place of the conventional Maximum Likelihood Estimation variance estimator and observations were 
allowed to be not independent within cluster.* significant at 10% level. ** significant at  5% level. ***significant at 
1% level. Marginal effects show the increment in the probability relative to the sample mean, corresponding to 
the particular characteristic, relative to the reference group. The reference group: a blue-collar worker, aged 20-













Table 9: Probability of Getting Job through Government Employment Office or 
Competition: Marginal Effects 




Social Network: Size 















    













Social Network: Quality 
    








    



































Age Group:  
    































    
                  Less than Secondary   0.093*** 
(6.35) 
---- ---- 
                  Secondary & University  0.174*** 
(9.06) 
---- ----  














    
































    




















    














    
Log-Likelihood -1832.69  -1217.82  -602.10 
Pseudo R squared  0.418  0.390  0.279 
Sample size   4522  3085  1437 
Notes: Absolute values of robust t-statistics are in parentheses Robust (Huber/White/sandwich) estimator of the 
variance was used in place of the conventional Maximum Likelihood Estimation variance estimator and observations were 
allowed to be not independent within cluster.* significant at 10% level. ** significant at  5% level. ***significant at 
1% level. The reference group: a blue-collar worker aged 20-29 years old who has no education, and lives in 





















Figure 1b : Incomplete
symmetric network  
(n=6 and s=3) 
Figure 1a : Complete
symmetric network 
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Figure 2a : Incomplete
symmetric network 
with uniform mix 
(n=4 and s=2) 
Figure 2b : Incomplete
symmetric network 
with uniform mix 
(n=6 and s=3) 
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Figure 2c : Incomplete
symmetric network 
with uniform mix 




Figure 3a: Predicetd Probability of Employed Worker Obtaining a 
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Figure 3b: Predicetd Probability of Uneducated Employed 
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Figure 3c: Predicetd Probability of Educated Employed Worker 
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Figure 4a: Predicetd Probability of Unemployed Using 
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Figure 4b: Predicetd Probability of Uneducated 
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Figure 4c: Predicetd Probability of Educated Unemployed Using 







0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
Density ( population per inhabited square Kilometre)
P
r
e
d
i
c
t
e
d
 
P
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
 
 